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ABSTRACT
We analyse the effects of fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union on inflation, public
expenditure and the optimal degree of conservatism of the central bank. Our main result is that,
when the fiscal authorities internalise the spillover effects originating from their loose fiscal
stances, monetary policy commitment problems are mitigated. As a result, the optimal degree of
conservatism of the central bank declines. Moreover, we show that the Stability Pact can be seen
as an optimally designed linear penalty in the utility function of the fiscal authorities. This is
able to achieve the same desired result as  fiscal policy co-ordination but without an explicit
commitment to it.
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I   INTRODUCTION
The main concern often expressed in the past about the European Monetary Union (EMU)
was that it would reduce countries’ flexibility in the use of inflation as a source of revenue
and that it would lead to a somewhat unacceptable loss of sovereignty in the management of
monetary policy. Now that EMU is a reality, however, a new concern has arisen. The
question is: is fiscal policy co-ordination desirable ?
In this paper we provide an argument in favour of co-ordination. This is relates to the fact
that within our framework governments perceive that a unilateral fiscal expansion determines
a real exchange rate appreciation, which in a monetary union is entirely reflected into a
change of the relative prices. Hence, they have an incentive to increase public expenditure
relative to foreign countries because higher domestic prices will reduce the real product
wage
1 and boost output.
We show that, when the fiscal authorities fail to internalise the spillovers originating from
their fiscal stances, both government expenditures and tax distortions are excessively high.
As a result, output deviations from its natural level increase and the traditional time-
inconsistency problem of monetary policy worsens.
Our main result is that co-ordination internalises these inefficiencies therefore removing both
the fiscal bias - temptation to spend more than the socially optimal level - and its impact on
the size of the more traditional inflation bias. This also reduces the optimal degree of
conservatism of the monetary authority. In fact, in so far as that the fiscal authorities engage
in expansionary fiscal policies, the central bank will have to pursue a tighter monetary policy
in order to deliver a particular rate of inflation.3
Still how to achieve co-ordination is not an easy matter. In the paper we also suggest an
alternative mechanism based on a principal agent micro-framework - that we define à la
Walsh - that can be used to obtain the same positive results of fiscal policy co-ordination, but
without an explicit commitment to it.
Our framework is very close in spirit to van der Ploeg (1990 and 1993), which provides a
modern version of the Mundell-Flemming open-economy model, and Levine and Pearlman
(1998),  which analyses the fiscal and monetary policy interactions between the “ins and
outs” to a monetary union. Here we develop a relatively more simple model of monetary
union, based on micro-foundations. We endogenise fiscal policy and concentrate on the case
where the real exchange rate is the only channel of policy transmission. Our contribution is to
introduce an explicit balanced budget rule and analyse the important distortionary effects of a
tax levied on income
2.
The paper proceeds as follows: sections II and III analyse the different nature of the
commitment problems facing the central bank and the national governments. Section IV
presents a simple application of the Walsh contracts, while section V goes one step further
and computes the optimal degree of central bank independence. Finally, section VI
summarises and concludes.
II   THE MODEL
Let us consider n+1 interdependent economies with identical economic structures and
specialising in the production of one good. Goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption,4
while capital stock is exogenously fixed. Countries run balanced budgets and are able to
finance their public expenditure only by raising taxation
3.
The demand side of the model closely follows Levine and Pearlman (1998). We assume that
in country i  [i = 0,n]  Cij  units of good j are imported from country j  [j = 0, n]
4. Given the
total consumption expenditureCi , consumers in country i choose the units of consumption
{ } Cij j n =0,  to maximise an expected utility function E Ui -1( )  where:
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Eij  is the real exchange rate between country i and j  and g ij  is the share of good j in the
consumption of the representative consumer of country i. Government spending Gi  is
assumed to fall exclusively on domestic goods. Observe that the utility of individuals depends
on the levels of both government and private consumption. The latter is allocated equally
between domestic and foreign goods.
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where the first two terms stand, respectively, for domestic and foreign consumption, and Gi
is public expenditure. We can now express all exchange rates relative to country zero and
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We are now ready to move on to the supply side. Consider country 0.  We assume that
production is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function:




exp                                                                                             (5)
where u is a supply shock
5,  K  is the exogenous capital stock and  AL are the effective units
of labour. Wage setters have disposable real wage targets and set one period nominal wage
contracts at time t-1 to minimise an expected utility  E U t t -1( ) of the type (small letters
denote logs):
( ) U w p w t
c = - - - t $
2
                                                                                               (6)
where,t  is a distortionary income tax and $ w is the wage target.  p
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ei  the log of the real exchange rate of country i relative to country 0. Observe that equation
(6) implies that  wage setters only care about a real post-tax wage target, while they regard
any employment target as unimportant
6.
The demand for labour  is obtained by equating the marginal productivity of labour to the
real wage:
w p f K A l u - = - - - ( , ) 1 b                                                                                          (8)
where   ( ) ( ) ( ) f K A A K - - = - + - + 1 1 1 1 , log log log b b b
The supply-side of the model is completed with an exogenous partial indexing arrangement
k˛(0,1) linking the nominal wage to the CPI so that:6
( ) [ ] w w k p E p
c c = + - -1                                                                                          (9)
Differentiating (6) with respect to w and combining this result with (9) we get an expression
for the real product wage:
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Hence, the final equation for employment is derived combining (8)-(10) to obtain:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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with e m b =   and l f K A w = - -
1
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[ ( , ) $]. The following assumptions are made about
the supply shocks:
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Equation (11) shows that employment depends upon the familiar surprise price effect –
which can be eliminated with full indexation (k=1) –,  the expected level of income taxation
and  the supply shock. Employment also depends upon the real exchange rate, i.e. the relative
price. This happens because a real exchange rate appreciation contracts the real wage as
shown by (10).
Let us now define p = - - p p
c c
1 the CPI inflation of country 0 and  ~ ( ) p p p = - - E 1  the
inflation surprise. Likewise we define ~ ( ) e e E e i i i = - -1 . The next step in the model is to
express all variables in deviation form about a baseline steady state, where policy
instruments are set at their optimal values. Lower case variables will denote either a





, with Y  the steady-state7
path), or an absolute change, such as inflation rates or  g G Y G Y = - ). Demand and
supply equations of country 0  in a linearised form will then be
7:
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Equating demand and supply  in the domestic and foreign country we get the expressions for
the expected and surprise exchange rate effects. These are respectively:
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 (15) shows that a domestic public expenditure surprise determines a surprise appreciation of
the exchange rate, whereas the opposite is true in the case of a foreign surprise. The
combination of (13) and (14)-(15) gives our reduced form of output for  country i:
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Hence, employment depends upon the inflation surprise of the union, the relative spending
surprise and on the expected level of tax distortions. Finally, it is negatively related to the
country’s supply shock and on the sum of the shocks in the remaining n countries (this will
depend on the degree of openness of the economy which is captured by ( ) 1-y ).
It is important  to observe that (16) implies a potentially negative transmission of fiscal
policy. This relates to the fact that, for a given level of public expenditure in the home
country, an expenditure increase in the rest of the union results in a real exchange rate
appreciation abroad, which – as we have seen in (10) – reduces the real product wages and
increases foreign production. For the home country, however, this is equivalent to a real
depreciation, with opposite on its output level. Observe that the underlying reason for a
negative transmission of fiscal policy is the same as in van der Ploeg (1990) and Levine and
Pearlman (1998). Crucial to this result is the assumption of imperfect substitution between
domestic and foreign goods and the fact that government consumption falls entirely on
domestic goods. The sign of the transmission would of course change if we were to drop
these assumptions and consider models were demand increases output without affecting the
price level (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
III   THE GAME9
The game involves n+2 players: n+1 Governments (Fiscal Authorities, abbreviated with FA)
and 1 Central Bank (ECB). The loss function in deviation form of the fiscal authorities is:
( ) Ui
FA
i bFA yi y i cFAgi = + - + + p be 2 2 2 $                                                          (17)
(17) implies that the government has a bliss point at the baseline inflation and government
spending/GDP ratio
8, and a stochastic output target  $ y - be  relative to the socially
suboptimal natural rate. Similarly, the loss function of the ECB is:
( ) U ECB
i bECB yi y i cECBgi i
n
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In our modelling framework, monetary and fiscal policies are discretionary and they both
have a response advantage relative to wage setters. Inflation and government spending are
chosen in each period after nominal wage  contracts and expectations of inflation for that
period are formed, and  current shocks have been observed.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Expectations of inflation and government spending are formed by wage setters for each
country
2. The supply shocks occur in each economy and are observed by both the private sector
and the policymakers. All can respond except wage setters.
3. The ECB and the Fiscal Authorities independently and simultaneously set inflation and
government spending in response to shocks.
The ECB minimises (18) with respect to average inflation, with output being given by
equation (16); at the same time, fiscal policy is assumed to be conducted purely in terms of
government expenditure, i.e. the fiscal authorities minimise (17) with respect to  g.10
Two scenarios are examined:
- fiscal policies in EMU countries are not co-ordinated;
- fiscal policies are co-ordinated.
First Scenario (FPNC)
The First Order Conditions when fiscal authorities do not co-ordinate  are:
( ) [ ] p c be i ECB i i
i
n
b y y + + - =
= ￿ $
0
0                                                                              (19)
( )( ) b y y c g FA i i FA i m y be 1 1 0 - + - + = $                                                                       (20)
We now separate the first order conditions into deterministic (expectational)  ( , , ) p g y and
stochastic components (~, ~,~) p g y . Since we are dealing with a model in deviation form, we
can then identify any positive deterministic components as a bias.  Hence, calculating the
deterministic component of output from (16), we get that the inflation and fiscal biases are
respectively:
( ) p c c b
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where x m y b b = - - bFA 1 1 1 ( )( ) .
Observe that (21) implies the existence of an important spillover effect of the fiscal bias on
the inflation bias. This derives from the fact that, when the central bank anticipates that the
fiscal authorities will relax their fiscal stances, it will expect output to further deviate from
its natural rate. Hence, if it cares at all about output, it will be tempted to deliver a higher
rate of inflation. This of course only happens in absence of full wage indexation (k „1), i.e.
when a direct employment stabilisation role for monetary policy still exists.
Second Scenario (FPC)11
When fiscal policies are co-ordinated, fiscal authorities are not tempted to engineer
expenditure surprises any longer. This happens because they are aware that these have no
effects on output and that they will not be affected by public expenditure externalities.
Therefore, while the first order condition for the monetary authority remains unaltered, the
one of the FAs becomes:
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= 0  we get:
gFPC = 0                                                                                                                 (24)
The spending bias is  zero if fiscal authorities act co-operatively. Hence, the negative
spillover on the inflation bias disappears.
<   FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   >
Fig. 1 b summarises the above results. Any shifting in the upper right of the graph represents
a worsening of what we may call the economy’s structural inefficiency because both the
inflation and the spending bias increase. The ideal point to be for a country  is 0, where both
biases are absent. However, the perceived existence of a stabilisation role for both fiscal and
monetary policies moves the equilibrium  in the upper right of the graph (point B).  The main
result of the paper is that, when tax distortions are endogenous, the inflation bias becomes a
function of the spending bias. Graphically, the line of the  inflation bias is no more horizontal
as implied in Levine and Pearlman (1998) (fig. 1c-1d),  but it has a positive slope equal to
bECBc b b ( ) / 1- . Therefore, the higher the spending bias, the higher the inflation bias will
be. As shown in (21), such spillover effects  arise in the model via the deterministic
component of output, which is itself proportional to the spending bias. Observe that, if we
were to go back to the more simple case illustrated by the traditional literature where trade
unions are assumed to ignore the distortionary effects of income taxes in their utility12
functions, the deterministic component of output is zero. This means that the relationship
between the two biases also disappears. In this case the inflation bias simply becomes:
p c c = - = b y y b y ECB ECB ( $ ) $                                                                                     (25)
This is the same result obtained by Rogoff (1985). In this particular case where fiscal
spillover effects are absent, the only relevant element which is able to reduce the inflation
bias is the degree of conservatism of the central bank.
IV   CO-ORDINATION THROUGH A WALSH MECHANISM
In this section we sketch a possible institutional arrangement that could substitute  fiscal
policy co-ordination. The idea comes from a recent paper by Walsh (1995). He attempts to
solve the time inconsistent problem of monetary policy by proposing a contract between the
central bank and the government based on a principal-agent framework. Such a contract is
structured in such a way that the outcome of the central bank’s maximisation problem results
in the socially optimal monetary rule. We observe that our case here is rather different for
two reasons. Firstly, we do not explicitly address Rogoff’s output stabilisation problem.
Secondly, the distinction  between the agent and the principal (Ecofin?)  is not well defined.
However, we can still work on the idea that, if the fiscal authorities spend more than the
socially optimal level, they will be subject to a fine.
Suppose that the sovereign fiscal authorities face a loss function of the kind  L =  JU + pg,
where JU  is the money value of the utility function
9 and p is a linear penalty in public
expenditure of the kind implied by the Stability Pact. When minimising its loss function, each
fiscal authority will take into account the fact that it will be subject to a disutility whenever
its level of public expenditure exceeds the socially optimal one. The new loss function that
each fiscal authority now faces is:13
LFAi Ui
FA pigi i bFA yi y i cFAgi pigi = + = + - + + + p be 2 2 2 ( $ ) .                          (26)
Therefore, the optimal punishment which is able to achieve the zero level of fiscal bias  is :
p b y yb i FA FA = - = m y l 1 1 ( ) $ $                                                                                       (27)
(Proof. See Appendix A)
As (27) shows, the punishment is directly linked, by a factor l , to the  employment target
and the weight that the fiscal authorities are giving to it. Provided the penalty is credible, the
effect of this punishment will be to reduce the level of public expenditure in each country.
This leads us back to the optimal result obtained under the scenario of co-ordination.
V   SIMULATIONS
So far the degree of central bank independence has been considered as exogenously fixed.
What happens if this assumption changes? Unfortunately, the model in this case becomes too
complicated for an analytical solution to be worked out. Therefore, we need to recur to
simulation techniques. The aim of our simulation exercise is to find the optimal degree of
independence of the ECB (CBI) - computed as the ratio b b FA ECB  - and to see how such a
degree depends on the correlation of the supply shocks.
       We start by combining (16) with the first order conditions for inflation and public
expenditure  under scenarios i) and ii). This gives the two loss functions of the fiscal
authorities to be minimised with respect to bECB . These are:14
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       in the case of fiscal policy non co-ordination, and:
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       when fiscal authorities act co-operatively.
       Results (see appendix B  for details) are summarised in figures 2-4. First, the optimal
level of central bank independence is negatively related to the degree of correlation of the
supply shocks. The closer the correlation coefficient to one (i.e. the more symmetric the
shocks become), the lower the optimal level of central bank independence. The reason for this
downward slope is that, when shocks are symmetric, relative prices do not adjust
automatically. Hence, the central bank should put more weight on output stabilisation and
less on the goal of reducing the inflationary bias. (this follows from equation (15)).15
       A second result we obtain is that the optimal degree of central bank independence
remains unaffected by the decision to co-ordinate fiscal policies in a model without
distortionary taxation. This derives from the fact that, because tax distortions are absent, the
central bank does not account for the fact that under fiscal policy non co-ordination (FPNC)
the output level contracts below the zero steady state level. Conversely, when the output
effect of tax distortions are endogenous, co-ordination reduces the optimal degree of
independence of the ECB because it removes the fiscal spillover effects on the inflation bias.
Moreover since under FPC fiscal distortions disappear and monetary time inconsistencies are
mitigated, welfare is increased. It is important to observe that, without fiscal policy co-
ordination, the welfare loss of the fiscal authorities is always higher for all correlation
coefficients in the case with distortionary taxes. This is due to the fact that existence of
misperceptions about the role of public expenditures when fiscal policies lack co-ordination
induces governments to stabilise output by making stronger use of demand-side (i.e. public
expenditure) policies. However, under the assumption of symmetry between countries, this
starts a vicious circle whose only effect is to increase distortions even more.
VI   CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we argue in favour of fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union. We show
that, when the fiscal authorities internalise the important spillover effects originating from
their excessively expansionary fiscal policies, they reduce the structural inefficiencies -
inflation and spending biases - that otherwise are likely to characterise their economies. Such
a positive result can be obtained either with the explicit co-ordination of fiscal policies or
with the introduction of a credible penalty in public expenditure - of the kind implied by the
stability pact - in the utility function of each fiscal authority. Finally, our simulation results16
suggest that, when fiscal authorities act co-operatively, the optimal degree of  conservatism
of the central bank declines. This happens because, to the extent that national authorities
engage in expansionary and inflationary fiscal policies, the monetary authorities will have to
pursue a tighter monetary policy in order to achieve a particular inflation rate. Now that
EMU is on its way, we believe these could be  additional arguments in favour of co-operation
and a more rigid application of the stability pact.
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APPENDIX A: PUNISHMENT “ ‘A  LA  WALSH ”
If the fiscal authorities know that they will be punished when they spend too much, they will
take account of this when calculating their first order condition. Their FOC will then be
modified as follows:
b y y c g p FA i i i FA i i m y be 1 1 0 ( )( $ ) - + - + + =                                                           (A1)
Rewriting the above expression only in terms of deterministic components we get:












1 1 ( ) $
                                                                                          (A3)
Hence,  the bias is equal to zero if the punishment p is  p b y FA = - m y 1 1 ( ) $.20
APPENDIX B:    CALIBRATIONS
       The calibrations used are summarised in the table below:
 
 
 n = 10
1. cFA  = 5
2. b  = 0.3
3. Unemployment = 5%
4. Inflation  = 5%
5. Variance of the Supply shocks = 3%
6. C Y = 0.6
7. G Y  = 0.2
8. k=0.5
9. bFA   = chosen to calibrate an annual inflation of 5%
 
 
        The number insiders (n+1) has been set  equal to 11, which corresponds to the
number of countries who are going to adopt the single currency by the year 2002. Observe,
however, that our model assumes identical economies and therefore it would consider two
countries like Germany and Luxembourg, for example, as carrying exactly the same weight.
For what concerns the indexing arrangement (k), an average number has been imposed
given the reduced high relevance of seignorage for many European economies. Alteration21
of this particular assumption does not change, however, the qualitative nature of the
results.22
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FIG. 2   FISCAL POLICY NON CO-ORDINATION
Case with distortionary tax









































































































FIG. 3   FISCAL POLICY CO-ORDINATION







































































































FIG. 4   FISCAL POLICY NON CO-ORDINATION
Case without distortionary tax








































































































                                                       
1 We assume that nominal wages are fixed a period ahead and cannot be revised.
2 We have allowed income taxes to play a crucial role in the determination of wages because
increased tax rates in the major industrial economies have made both trade unions and workers
more conscious of the real value of their after-tax salaries.
3 The introduction of seignorage would not alter the substance of our results.
4 All variables are dated at time t.  A subscript +1 indicates time t + 1 and a subscript -1 indicates
time t - 1.
5 Assumptions about the shocks are presented later on in the paper.
6 It would be straightforward to show that introduction of an employment target would complicate
the algebra without affecting the nature of the results.
7 The transformation:  y l = - - ( ) 1 b be  has been applied in the supply side of the model.
8 Observe that both individuals and the fiscal authorities care about public expenditure. This is not
assumed to be of the ‘hole in the ground’ variety (van der Ploeg 1993) and yields direct utility (see
equation 1).
9 We can assume that J is equal to unity for analytical simplicity.